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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
STUART FOSTER HOUGHTON,

CaseNo.20010020-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgement of conviction1 for Criminal Nonsupport of a
Child, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999), in the
Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge,
presiding.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)
(e) (Supp. 2001), which grants this Court jurisdiction over appeals from district court
criminal cases not involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony.

STATEMENT OF THE FIRST ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
First Issue: Did the trial court err in issuing three jury instructions which are incorrect

1

A copy of the Minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment," R. 112-13, is
included in Addendum A.

statements of the law, argumentative, duplicative, or inconsistent with other instructions?
Standard of Review: "The standard of review for jury instructions to which counsel has
objected is correctness." State v. Pearson. 1999 UT App 220, ^ 7, 985 P.2d 919 (quoting
State v. Brvant. 965 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)).
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 141 [186-88].

STATEMENT OF THE SECOND ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Second Issue: Does the conviction fail where the State did not present sufficient
evidence that Appellant Stuart Houghton ["Mr. Houghton"] did not have just cause in
failing to provide for the support of his child?
Standard of Review: "When a jury verdict is challenged on the ground that the evidence
is insufficient,... '[this court] review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.1" State
v. Stringham. 957 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Hamilton. 827
P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992)). "[0]nly if that evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he . . . was convicted"' will this Court reverse
the conviction. State v. Pearson. 1999 UT App 220, ^ 8, 985 P.2d 919 (quoting State v.
Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1322 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)).
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 141 [103-04].

2

RELEVANT STATUTE AND RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1.

The following statute is determinative of the issues on appeal:
Criminal Nonsupport, Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999). The full text of this

statute is provided in Addendum B.
2.

The following Rule of Criminal Procedure is relevant on appeal:
Instructions, Utah R.Crim.Pro. 19 (2001). The full text of this rule is provided in

Addendum C.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On 28 March 2000 Mr. Houghton was charged by information with one count of
Criminal Nonsupport. R. 3-5. He pled not guilty to the charge and was tried before a jury
on 8 November 2000. R. 141 [3]. Following the State's presentation of its case, the
defense counsel made a motion to dismiss the case for insufficiency of evidence. R. 141
[103-04]. The trial court denied the motion. R. 141 [104].
Before sending the jury out to deliberate, the trial court prepared jury instructions.
R. 141 [150-67]. The defense counsel objected to three of the instructions, numbers 7, 10
and 11, which read as follows:
7. You are instructed that the offense of Criminal Non-Support is
committed not only where there is a complete failure to support the child,
but also where there is a partial failure to provide for the children, so long
as the support furnished is not adequate under the circumstances.
R.83.

3

10. You are instructed that a parent must make reasonable efforts to find
ways to provide support for his or her children.
R.86.
11. One who fails to diligently seek employment or engages in activity
causing the loss of employment does not have a lawful excuse to a failure
to provide charge.
R.87.
The defense counsel asserted that these instructions were not statements of the
law, but commentary upon the evidence. R. 141 [186]. She also indicated that the
instructions were duplicative because other instructions adequately described the
elements of the offense. R. 141 [186-87]. The trial court overruled the defense counsel's
objection, and issued instructions 7, 10, and 11 to the jury. R. 141 [155-56].
Mr. Houghton was convicted of the third degree felony of Criminal Nonsupport.
R. 104. Hefileda timely notice of appeal. R. 115-16.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. Houghton and Nancy Parks ["Ms. Parks"] were married in 1982, R. 141 [58,
106], and had one child together, Hillary Rose Houghton ["Hillary"].2 In 1986 Mr.
Houghton and Ms. Parks divorced and Ms. Parks was awarded custody of Hillary.
Exhibit Envelope [Decree of Dissolution of Marriage 1-2]. The divorce decree obliged
Mr. Houghton to pay child support in the amount of $200 per month. R. 141 [59].
2

Ms. Parks was married previously and had one daughter, Emery, from this union. R.
141 [59-60]. Ms. Parks'firsthusband died in an automobile accident. R. 141 [60].
4

Throughout his marriage to Ms. Parks, Mr. Houghton had been employed as a
welder at Snappy Welding Service. He remained there for a year or two after the divorce.
R. 141 [75-76,107-08]. During that time, he made regular child support payments. R.
141 [76-77]. Then the shop was sold, and Mr. Houghton's job ended. R. 141 [108].
About that time, Mr. Houghton's child support payments became less consistent. R. 141
[77]. Sometimes he made the payments, sometimes he made only partial payments, and
sometimes he did not make the payments. R. 141 [77, 114]; Exhibit Envelope [Child
Computation of Arrears 1987-93],
After becoming unemployed, Mr. Houghton worked at a variety of part-time and
temporary jobs. R. 141 [107-14]. He helped install a log processor for Clammoth Lumber
Company, R. 141 [109], worked as a construction millwright for O & S Contractors, R.
141 [110-12], helped a man build some corrals, R. 141 [113], and helped another man
build decks and remodel homes. R. 141 [113]. He "took whatever [he] could find." R.
141 [113]. He testified, "I've tried to make [child support payments] as much as I could,
at least partial payments. I have in mind keeping with it but at times I just didn't have
enough to make the full payment but I tried to pay something." R. 141 [114]. The last
payment that he made was in June of 1993, when he made a payment of $844.70.3

3

A copy of the Child Support Computation of Arrears, calculated from 1987 until 2000,
is attached in Addendum D. Exhibit Envelope [Child Support Computation of Arrears].
Mr. Houghton made regular child support payments until September, 1987. R. 141 [7677, 100]; Exhibit Envelope [Child Support Computation of Arrears in 1993]. In 1987 and 1988
Mr. Houghton's payments to the Office of Recovery Services staggered between $85 and $200
per month, and a few payments were not made at all. R. 141 [100]; Exhibit Envelope [Child
5

By autumn of 1994 Mr. Houghton was having health problems. R. 141 [115]. He
had a hernia, a neck injury, cataracts, a foot injury, and hemorrhoids. Id. Additionally, he
was suffering from a palsy which had begun when he was thirteen years old. Id. He had
experienced tremors in his hands for many years, including the years he was married to
Ms. Parks,4 but the tremors worsened after he turned forty. R. 141 [116]. By the end of
1994, he was admitted to a Veterans Administration facility, the White City Domiciliary,
because of his physical problems and his homelessness.5 He stayed there about eight
months. R. 141 [117, 129-30]. He received hernia surgery, cataract surgery, anus surgery,
and dental treatment. R. 141 [117]. Additionally, he was given a prescription, Propanol,
to treat his tremors. R. 141 [118]. The prescription was not effective. R. 141 [119].
Support Computation of Arrears in 1987-88]. In 1989 Mr. Houghton made four payments of
$200 each. R. 141 [100]; Exhibit Envelope [Child Support Computation of Arrears in 1989]. In
1990 he made four payments of $200 and one payment of $400. R. 141 [100]; Exhibit Envelope
[Child Support Computation of Arrears in 1990]. In 1991 he made one payment of $200 and one
payment of $100. R. 141 [100]; Exhibit Envelope [Child Support Computation of Arrears in
1991]. In 1992 the Office of Recovery Services received a payment of $995, part of which
originated from a tax refund, a payment of $200, a payment of $452, a payment of $339, and a
payment of $396.10. R. 141 [101]; Exhibit Envelope [Child Support Computation of Arrears in
1992]. In 1993, he made a payment of $125, a payment of $58, a payment of $200, and a
payment of $844.70. R. 141 [101-02]; Exhibit Envelope [Child Support Computation of Arrears
in 1993].
4

R. 141 [73]. Although Ms. Parks testified that Mr. Houghton's shaking was "normal to
people who drink a lot," Id, and that he drank one beer every evening when he arrived home
from work, R. 141 [74], the shaking does not appear to be related to drinking. Ms. Parks
indicated that Mr. Houghton would shake more when he was nervous and sometimes he
wouldn't shake at all. R. 141 [74]. Additionally, Ms. Parks testified that Mr. Houghton had
experienced hand tremors from the time shefirstmet him when she was fifteen years old. R. 141
[74, 77]. Mr. Houghton indicated that he had suffered from hand tremors since he was thirteen
years old. R. 141 [115].
5

R. 141 [116, 130]. Mr. Houghton is a veteran of the Vietnam War, where he served as a
medic. R. 141 [129-30].
6

While Mr. Houghton was at the Domiciliary, Ms. Parks called and left him a
message. He returned the call. R. 141 [67]. Ms. Parks and Mr. Houghton discussed the
arrangement of a visit between Hillary and Mr. Houghton.6 Then Ms. Parks asked Mr.
Houghton to pay child support. Id The two began arguing. Id. Ms. Parks testified that
Mr. Houghton called her an obscene name, said that he would not ever send her any
money, and hung up on her.7
After Mr. Houghton left the Domiciliary, he went to work at Harris Ranch, which
was owned by Mr. Houghton's close friend, Earl Harris. R. 141 [133-34]. Mr. Houghton
roped and branded livestock, repaired equipment, welded, and helped with other assorted
tasks. R. 141 [120]. In exchange, he received room and board. R. 141 [120, 134]. He
stayed at Harris Ranch for about a year, and then moved to another ranch to help plant an
alfalfa crop. R. 141 [121,134]. He was allowed to live in a trailer near the alfalfa field,
but was not given wages or a salary. R. 141 [121].
Mr. Houghton later went to Canada and helped refurbish an abandoned cannery
town which the owners hoped to turn into a hunting and fishing attraction. R. 141 [12122, 135]. Again, he received only room and board for his work. R. 141 [122, 136]. Then
he worked at Willy Roof Cleaning, where he did odd jobs in exchange for permission to

6

R. 141 [69]. Mr. Houghton and Ms. Parks spent their married life in Oregon, and Mr.
Houghton remained in Oregon thereafter. R. 141 [105-07]. However, Ms. Parks moved to Utah
in 1988. R. 141 [76].
7

Id. Conversely, Mr. Houghton testified that he told Ms. Parks that he couldn't send any
money at that time, but that he would send money when he could. R. 141 [126-27].
7

stay in an old trailer that had previously been used for storage. R. 141 [123].
Mr. Houghton testified that he applied for various paying jobs, but potential
employers "would see me shaking and wouldn't want anything to do with me." R. 141
[125]. Mr. Houghton also applied for disability benefits because of the tremors in his
hands,8 but his application was denied and he did not appeal. R. 141 [126].
Most recently, Mr. Houghton went to work for a Corvette shop. R. 141 [123, 142].
The owner allowed Mr. Houghton to clean out "a storage room behind the parts
department down in the basement," and he stayed there. R. 141 [124]. This arrangement
improved Mr. Houghton's living conditions because a bathroom and shower were
available to him. R. 141 [123-24]. Such facilities had not been available at Willy Roof
Cleaning. Id. As with his previous jobs, however, he did not receive a salary or wages,
only a place to stay and something to eat. R. 141 [124,144].
Since leaving the White City Domiciliary, Mr. Houghton has not paid any child
support9 and has not had a job which paid him wages or a salary. R. 141 [124]; Exhibit
Envelope [Child Support Computation of Arrears 1994-2000]. Ms. Parks testified that
her current husband has supported Hillary and the rest of the family with income from his

8

R. 141 [125]. Mr. Houghton applied for the benefits after he was ordered to do so by an
Oregon court which had found him in contempt for failing to pay child support. R. 141 [138-39].
9

Ms. Parks testified that Mr. Houghton sent Hillary $50 for her birthday one year, but
Ms. Parks was unable to recall the year. R. 141 [64].
8

job.10 However, Ms. Parks has been unable to provide Hillary with advantages such as
voice lessons, art classes, and fitness center membership. R. 141 [62-63].

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
As a whole, the jury instructions are confusing and misleading because three
instructions are incorrect statements of the law, argumentative, duplicative, or
inconsistent with other instructions.
One instruction directly conflicts with the Criminal Nonsupport statute. That
instruction indicates that partial payments of child support constitute the crime of
Criminal Nonsupport "so long as the support furnished is not adequate under the
circumstances." R. 83. However, the statute indicates that Criminal Nonsupport is
committed when a parent fails to support a child and the child is either in "needy
circumstances" or "would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a
source other than the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf." Utah Code Ann. § 767-201(1) (a) and (b) (1999). Because the phrase "not adequate under the circumstances"
is fundamentally different from the phrase "needy circumstances," the jury was misled
regarding a basic element of the crime. On this basis alone, Mr. Houghton is entitled to a
reversal of his conviction. See State v. Pearson, 1999 UT App 220, U 12, 985 P.2d 919
0°[A]n accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential, [and so]
10

R. 141 [61]. Besides Ms. Parks, her husband, and Hillary, the Parks' household
consists of Ms. Parks' daughter, Emery, from herfirstmarriage, R. 141 [60], and another
daughter, Annika, from Ms. Parks current marriage. Id.
9

the failure to provide such an instruction is reversible error that can never be considered
harmless."') (citation omitted).
Another instruction, which indicates that "[o]ne who fails to diligently seek
employment or engages in activity causing the loss of employment does not have a
lawful excuse to a failure to provide charge," R. 87, is also incorrect. There is nothing in
statutory or case law to support that diligent, as opposed to reasonable, effort is required.
In fact, the case law infers that reasonableness is the correct standard.11 Additionally, the
instruction is confusing because a reasonableness instruction was given, R. 86, as well as
an instruction that the simple failure to provide the support was the prohibited criminal
act. R. 80, 82. These instructions are irreconcilable, and rendered the instructions
misleading and confusing as a whole.
The instruction which indicates that a parent "must make reasonable efforts to find
ways to provide support for his or her children," R. 86, not only contributes to the
confusion, it aids in the overemphasis of the parent's duty to provide support. The
parent's duty to provide support is covered in no less than five separate jury instructions,
R. 80, 82, 83, 86, and 87, and three of them do not refer to the element of whether a
parent had just cause to do so. Further, the element of just cause is not covered in any

11

See State v. Barlow. 851 P.2d 1191, 1193-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (cert, denied 859
P.2d 585 (Utah 1993) (examining whether defendant had the ability to generate income, earned
wages during the period in which he failed to provide support, and failed to make child support
payments); State v. Bess, 137 P. 829, 832 (Utah 1913) (examining whether the defendant
willfully remained idle when he had the opportunity to work and whether he wasted his
earnings).
10

separate instructions. As the Utah Supreme Court indicated, "[t]he overemphasis of a
point may be as misleading to a jury as the omission of a point," State v. Clayton, 646
P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982), and such an error constitutes reversal.
Finally, taken together, the three instructions are argumentative. The partial
payments instruction is especially damaging because it focuses upon Mr. Houghton's
effort to pay whatever he could, even when he did not have enough money to make the
entire payment, and then characterizes this effort as a criminal act. Evidence of partial
payments could just as easily have been construed as an indication that Mr. Houghton
was doing his best, but the jury instruction did not allow for such an inference. This is
poor public policy as well as argumentative because it discourages those living in poverty
from paying whatever they can to support their child.
The second issue in this case involves the prosecutor's failure to present sufficient
evidence to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Houghton did not have just cause
in failing to pay child support. The term "just cause" refers to a defendant's "inability to
provide support," Barlow, 851 P.2d at 1193, and is shown by proving that the defendant
lacked excuse or justification in failing to provide the support. Epp v. State. 814 P.2d
1011,1013(1991).
The evidence in this case indicates that Mr. Houghton lost his job and was able to
find only temporary or part-time work until he was admitted to the White City
Domiciliary for homelessness and health problems. R. 141 [107-116]. Thereafter,
because of the tremors in his hands, he couldfindonly basic labor jobs in exchange for
11

room and board. R. 141 [108-16]. The prosecutor failed to show that Mr. Houghton had
the ability to make child support payments and did not do so. The prosecutor also did not
show that Mr. Houghton's efforts to surmount his health and financial obstacles were in
bad faith. Therefore, the statutory requirements of Criminal Nonsupport were not met,
and Mr. Houghton's conviction should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ISSUING SUPERFLUOUS JURY
INSTRUCTIONS WHICH INACCURATELY STATED THE LAW,
COMMENTED UPON THE EVIDENCE, AND OVEREMPHASIZED ONE
LEGAL ELEMENT
Mr. Houghton's conviction should be reversed and this case should be remanded
for a new trial because the court issued three jury instructions which rendered the entire
charge confusing and misleading. Instructions five and six correctly described the
elements of the third degree felony of Criminal Nonsupport, R. 80-81, and the lesser
included offense of class A misdemeanor Criminal Nonsupport. R. 82. However, in the
next instruction the court erroneously instructed the jury that Criminal Nonsupport is
committed "not only where there is a complete failure to support the child, but also where
there is a partial failure to provide for the children, so long as the support furnished is not
adequate under the circumstances." R. 83, 141 [155].
There is no basis in statute or case law for this treatment of partial payments of
child support. In fact, the instruction is contrary to the statute because the statute focuses

12

upon the "needy circumstances" of a child, rather than upon the adequacy of the child's
circumstances. The instruction is effectively negative commentary upon Mr. Houghton's
effort to support his daughter by sending partial payments even though he could not pay
the entire amount. Such an instruction discourages those who are destitute from paying
whatever they can afford. It is poor policy as well as unfair.
Two other instructions magnified the error of the partial payments instruction by
emphasizing that a parent must "diligently seek employment" R. 87 and "make
reasonable efforts to find ways to provide support for his or her children." R. 86. These
instructions were superfluous because the jury had already been twice instructed that the
criminal act at issue was whether Mr. Houghton had "knowingly and without just cause
failed to provide for the support of the child

" R. 80, 82. Taken as a whole, the jury

instructions overemphasized the parental duty to provide support at the expense of
whether the parent had "just cause," R. 80, 82, in failing to do so. This was confusing and
misleading, especially in light of the erroneous partial payment instruction.
In reviewing jury instructions, this Court grants no deference to the trial court's
ruling and examines the instructions for correctness. State v. Widdison. 2000 UT App
185, K 52, 4 P.3d 100; State v. Pearson, 1999 UT App 220, If 7, 985 P.2d 919. The "[j]ury
instructions must be read and evaluated as a whole."12 They "must accurately and
adequately inform a criminal jury as to the basic elements of the crime charged." State v.
12

State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also State v. Bingham, 684
P.2d 43,45 (Utah 1984) (quoting State v. Brooks. 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981)); State v.
PascuaL 804 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
13

Larsen, 876 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The language should be clear and
definite, and "should be consistent and harmonious throughout the entire charge

"

Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 463 (13th ed. 1992). Further, "[a]
defendant [] has the right to have his or her theory of the case presented to the jury in a
clear and comprehensible manner." State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997). "In
determining whether the jury was properly instructed so as to avoid confusion and fairly
present the issues raised by both the State and Appellant, a reviewing court must consider
all of the jury instructions read together in light of the total evidence before the jury."
State v. Lawson. 688 P.2d 479,481 (Utah 1984).
Significantly, jury instructions should not be argumentative. Charles E. Torcia,
Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 463 (13th ed. 1992). Many courts have specified that
argumentative instructions are those which call attention to specific evidence or invite the
jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the two parties.13 In this State, the Rules of
Criminal Procedure prohibit a court's commentary upon the evidence.14 The reasons for
this prohibition are largely self-evident. Argumentative instructions issued by the trial
judge distort the legal principals which guide the jury and irreparably damage the jury's

13

People v. Pore. 997 P.2d 1214,1221-22 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (cert denied Pore v.
People. 2000 Colo. Lexis 633 (Colo. 2000)); People v. Earp, 978 P.2d 15, 54 (Cal. 1999) (U.S.
cert denied 529 U.S. 1005 (2000)); Madrid v. State. 910 P.2d 1340, 1346 (Wyo. 1996); State v.
Pavis, 874 P.2d 1156, 1163 (Kan. 1994); People v. Panielson. 838 P.2d 729, 743 (Cal. 1992);
and State v. Reneau. 804 P.2d 408, 409 (N.M. App. 1990).
14

Utah R.Crim.Pro. 19(d) (2001) ("The Court shall not comment on the evidence in the
case, and if the court refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the
exclusive judges of all questions of fact.")
14

objectivity in making factual determinations in a case. Explanation and argument should
be left to counsel in closing arguments, and not incorporated into the jury instructions.15
Further, instructions which confuse and mislead the jury by duplicating each other
or by overemphasizing a particular point are reversible error.16 In State v. Clayton the
Utah Supreme Court rejected an argument that a duplicative instruction should have been
given at trial, and held that "[t]he overemphasis of a point may be as misleading to a jury
as the omission of a point." State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982). The Utah
Supreme Court and this Court have both indicated that a trial court's failure to instruct
the jury on points of the law is reversible.17 The effects of overemphasizing and
duplicating a point are equally disastrous, and are also grounds for reversal.18

15

See Utah R.Crim. Pro. 19 (e) (2001) ("Arguments of the respective parties shall be
made after the court has instructed the jury.") See also Reneau, 804 P.2d at 409 ("Argument and
explanation are left to counsel.")
16

People v. Mandez. 997 P.2d 1254, 1270 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Inman. 950
P.2d 640, 645 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997); and People v. Mickev. 818 P.2d 84, 112-13 (Cal. 1991).
See also Salt Lake Citv v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("'[T]he trial court
does not err in refusing to give a requested instruction if the point is properly covered in other
instructions presented to the jury.'" (citation omitted)); State v. Reedv. 681 P.2d 1251, 1252-53
(Utah 1984) ("[I]t is not error to refuse an instruction if its content is set out in others.")
17

Reedy, 681 P.2d at 1252; State v. Stringham. 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

18

See State v. Clayton. 646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982) ("The defendant also complains
that the trial court erred in failing to give a separate 'reasonable alternative hypothesis'
instruction, in spite of the clear coverage of this point in the instruction quoted above. There was
no need to repeat the same instruction twice. The overemphasis of a point may be as misleading
to a jury as the omission of a point."); Stringham. 957 P.2d at 608 ("[B]ecause '[t]he general rule
is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential,' failure to
provide such an instruction is reversible error that can never be considered harmless." (quoting
State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)).
15

A. Two Jury Instructions are Legally Incorrect and are also Unjust in Light
of the Evidence Presented in this Case
Two of the instructions, the instruction regarding partial payments of child support
and the instruction regarding the diligent search for employment, are incorrect statements
of the law.
The instruction regarding partial payments of child support, R. 83, directly
conflicts with the language of the Criminal Nonsupport statute. The statute indicates that
Criminal Nonsupport is committed when a parent "fails to provide for the support" of his
child where the child "(a) is in needy circumstances; or (b) would be in needy
circumstances but for support received from a source other than the defendant or paid on
the defendant's behalf." Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1) (1999). In other words, before
criminal liability may attach, the child must be in needy circumstances or be faced with
needy circumstances if not supported by another. If partial payments are enough to
alleviate a child's needy circumstances, criminal liability does not attach.19
The partial payments instruction, however, indicates that partial payments
19

Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (l)(a) & (b) (1999). A defendant may nevertheless be
civilly liable for the balance of child support payments owing. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9
(1996) (providing for the civil enforcement of a child support obligation which is due or owing).
Although the amount of child support ordered by a divorce decree or subsequent modifications is
used to measure damages in a civil lawsuit, see Department of Human Services v. Jacobv, 1999
UT App 52, f 21, 975 P.2d 939 (indicating that an enforcement action for child support
arrearages is a civil action and that damages are based upon the unpaid portions of ordered child
support); Jensen v. Bowcut. 892 P.2d 1053,1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (cert, denied 899 P.2d
1231 (Utah 1995)) (recognizing non-custodial father's civil liability for child support even after
death of custodial mother, where child's grandmother became guardian), the focus of the
Criminal Nonsupport statute is different. The Criminal Nonsupport statute focuses upon a child's
needy circumstances, not the amount ordered by divorce decree or subsequent modifications.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (l)(a) & (b) (1999).
16

constitute Criminal Nonsupport if the payments are "not adequate under the
circumstances." R. 83. Adequacy is a fluid concept which is completely dependant upon
the context in which the concept is used.20 Here, the evidence indicated that Ms. Parks
was unable to provide Hillary with advantages such as voice lessons, art classes, and
fitness center membership. R. 141 [62-63]. This may be deemed "inadequate under the
circumstances" if Hillary wanted such advantages, just as a child's lack of a polo pony
may be deemed inadequate if she wishes to participate in an international polo
tournament.
The statute, however, does not take such a broad view of the subject. The statute
focuses on the "needy circumstances"21 of a child and indicates that, if a defendant
knowingly and without just cause22 fails to provide support in such circumstances, he is
guilty of Criminal Nonsupport. The partial payments instruction broadened the meaning
of the Criminal Nonsupport statute to include any failure to provide items or advantages
viewed subjectively by the child or custodial parent as desirable or "adequate." R. 83. It
is therefore incorrect as a matter of law.

20

The word "adequate" is defined in the tenth edition of Merriam Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary as "sufficient for a specific requirement" or "barely sufficient or satisfactory" or
"lawfully and reasonably sufficient." Merriam-Webster, Inc., Merriam Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary 14 (10th ed. 1993).
21

The term "needy" is defined as "being in want" or "poverty stricken." MerriamWebster, Inc., Merriam-Webster's Collegiate dictionary 776 (10th ed. 1997).
22

Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1) (1999). The "without just cause" was deleted in a 1995
amendment, but was included in the jury instructions in this case. R. 80, 82. For further detail,
see Section II, fn. 38 of this brief.
17

Further, it is presumed that the instruction was harmful to Mr. Houghton.
"'[B]ecause "'[t]he general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of
an offense is essential,'" the failure to provide such an instruction is reversible error that
can never be considered harmless.'"23 The partial payments instruction was an inaccurate
description of the element of the child's needy circumstances, and cannot be considered
harmless.
The jury instruction requiring a defendant to provide for his child by "diligently
seek[ing] employment" is also incorrect. R. 87k There is nothing to support this
instruction as opposed to its companion instruction which requires a "reasonable" effort
to provide support. R. 86. Further, the case law supports the reasonableness instruction.
Under the predecessor to this statute, a parent could be convicted for failing to support
his children if "without just excuse [he] willfully neglected and refused to provide for
their support and maintenance . . . . " State v. Bess. 137 P. 829, 832 (Utah 1913). In other
words, if a defendant did not "willfully or otherwise remain idle when he could have
obtained employment," or "spen[d] or waste[] any part of the money earned by him in
dissipation or riotous living," he was not guilty under the statute. WL Reasonableness in
light of a defendant's earning capacity and willingness to work were the essential issues,

23

Pearson, 1999 UT App 220, f 12 (citation omitted). See also Stringham. 957 P.2d at
608 (reversing conviction where the jury instructions essentially mirrored the statutory language
and then defined two different mens rea states).
18

Id., and this has not changed.
Thus, the jury instruction specifying reasonableness, although superfluous because
the issue was already covered in the general elements instructions,25 is correct. The
instruction indicating that a parent commits Criminal Nonsupport by failing to "diligently
seek employment" is wrong, and its inclusion was reversible error.
As with the partial payments instruction, harmfulness is presumed. The diligent
search for employment instruction is an incorrect statement of the "knowing" and
"without just cause" elements of the crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1) (1999).
Because accurate instruction upon these elements is essential, the "'failure to provide
such an instruction is reversible error that can never be considered harmless.'" Pearson.
1999UTApp220,f7.

B. Two Instructions Commented upon the Evidence in Violation of Rule
19(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Besides being legally incorrect, the instruction regarding partial payment of child
support and the instruction requiring diligent search for employment serve no purpose
24

See State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191,1193-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Applying standard
used in Nevada in which "[t]he State 'can establish willfulness by showing that a defendant
neglects or refuses to provide support or maintenance for his or her children
the State could
establish willfulness by showing that a defendant '(1) had the ability to generate income; (2)
earned wages during the time period in question; and (3) failed to make the child support
payments/" (quoting Epp v. State, 814P.2d 1011, 1013 (1991)).
25

See Section I, Subsection C: "Because the Same Criminal Element was Covered by
Five Separate Jury Instructions, the Element was Overemphasized and the Jury's Objective
Evaluation of the Evidence was Damaged" (examining the affects of the superfluous jury
instructions).
19

other than that of argumentation. Argumentation is prohibited by Rule 19(d) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as persuasive case law.26
The instruction regarding partial payments of child support is argumentative
because it invited the jury to draw inferences in favor of the prosecution.27 First, it
focused attention upon Mr. Houghton's efforts to pay something towards Hillary's
support even when he couldn't make the full payment. Then, it cast these efforts in a
negative light by suggesting inadequacy. Evidence that Mr. Houghton made partial
payments could just as easily have been construed as a positive indication that he was
doing his best to provide support, but this inference is not permitted under this
instruction.
The instruction effectively endowed the prosecution's case with judicial approval.
The instruction's inference that Mr. Houghton's partial payments were not enough to
protect him from criminal liability was articulated by the prosecutor during closing
arguments.28 The instruction lent official support to the prosecutor's position. Moreover,
the instruction was not suggested by the prosecutor, R. 56-61, or defense counsel, R. 6526

Pore. 997 P.2d at 1221-22; Eare, 978 P.2d at 54; Madrid. 910 P.2d at 1346; Davis. 874
P.2d at 1163; Danielson. 838 P.2d at 743; and Reneau, 804 P.2d at 409.
27

The instruction charged the jury to find Mr. Houghton guilty if he made partial
payments which were "not adequate under the circumstances." R. 83.
28

The prosecutor pointed out that Mr. Houghton's resume indicated he had been a medic
and had attended some college, and that he did not do the best that he could do to obtain a paying
job. R. 141 [169-70]. The prosecutor argued that Mr. Houghton was happy working for room
and board on ranches and in shops, and that he should have appealed the denial of disability
benefits. R. 141 [171-72]. The prosecutor asserted "[t]his isn't doing the best you can." R. 141
[172].
20

73, but was added by the trial court upon its own volition. As argued by the defense
counsel, the court's sua sponte instruction was impermissible commentary upon the
evidence29 and constitutes reversible error.
The instruction requiring a diligent search for employment was also
argumentative. It focused specifically upon the prosecutor's argument that Mr. Houghton
did not do the best he could to obtain paid employment. In closing arguments the
prosecutor asserted that Mr. Houghton was happy working for room and board, and his
failure to obtain paid employment demonstrated that he was not doing his best. R. 141
[170-72, 185]. By instructing the jury that diligent effort was required, the trial court
effectively endorsed this argument.30
The diligent search instruction also foreclosed the jury's acceptance of Mr.
Houghton's argument that his shaking hands and health problems precluded him from
doing the hands-on work for which he had trained. R. 141 [175-76]. The defense counsel
pointed out that, because of Mr. Houghton's health issues, he became homeless for
awhile and was hospitalized. R. 141 [178-79]. Afterwards, the only jobs he could find
were those which he did in exchange for living in old trailers or storage rooms. Id These
points, which arguably showed just cause for Mr. Houghton's failure to pay child

See R. 141 [186-87] ("[I]n my view each of those [instructions objected to] amount not
to statement of the law but rather a comment on the evidence.")
30

R. 141 [172]. As with the partial payments instruction, the diligent search for
employment instruction was not suggested by the prosecutor, R. 56-61, or defense counsel, R.
65-73, but was added by the trial court upon its own volition.
21

support, were precluded from objective consideration because of the trial court's
incorrect and argumentative instruction that diligent searching for employment was
required. R. 87.
The partial payment and diligent search instructions were harmful in this case. The
prosecutor was required to show that Mr. Houghton did not have just cause in failing to
pay child support. R. 80-82. Mr. Houghton's effort to make "at least partial [support]
payments," R. 141 [114], his health problems, and his inability to find work arguably
showed just cause. However, the partial payment and diligent search instructions
foreclosed these inferences by incorrectly31 requiring the jury to focus exclusively upon
the adequacy of Hillary's circumstances, R. 83, and the diligence of Mr. Houghton's
employment search. R. 87. Without these instructions, there is a reasonable likelihood
that "there would have been a result more favorable" to Mr. Houghton.32 Thus, Mr.
Houghton's conviction should be reversed and this case should be remanded for a new
trial.

31

Section I, Subsection A of this brief details the incorrectness of the partial payments
and diligent search instructions.
32

See Rowlev v. Graven Brothers & Company. Inc.. 491 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 1971)
("The mandate of our law is that we do not reverse for mere error or irregularity. We do so only
if the complaining party has been deprived of a fair trial. The test to be applied is: Was there
error or irregularity such that there is a reasonable likelihood to believe that in its absence there
would have been a result more favorable to him?")(footnotes omitted). See also Moore v. Utah
Idaho Cent. R. Co., 174 P. 873, 879 (Utah 1918).
22

C. Because the Same Criminal Element was Covered bv Five Separate Jury
Instructions, the Element was Overemphasized and the Jury's
Objective Evaluation of the Evidence was Damaged
The element of failing to support a child was overemphasized because it was
covered in five separate jury instructions that overshadowed the issue of whether Mr.
Houghton had just cause in failing to pay support. R. 80, 82, 83, 86, and 87. Instructions
five and six included correct descriptions of all of the elements of third degree felony
Criminal Nonsupport, R. 80, and the lesser included offense of class A misdemeanor
Criminal Nonsupport. R. 82. These instructions were adequate and accurate. However,
the trial court chose to add another instruction addressing the specific circumstance,
already contemplated by the general elements instructions,33 of Mr. Houghton's partial
payment of child support. The court then added a fourth instruction indicating that "a
parent must make reasonable efforts to find ways to provide support for his or her
children." R. 86. Finally, a fifth instruction was given which indicated that a person who
"fails to diligently seek employment or engages in activity causing the loss of
employment does not have a lawful excuse to a failure to provide charge." R. 87.

R. 83. In accordance with the statute, the general elements instructions indicate that the
criminal act is the failure to provide for the support of the child when the child is in needy
circumstances, or would be in needy circumstances if not otherwise supported. R. 80, 82. If
partial payments alleviate a child's needy circumstances, there is no liability under the statute
because the "needy circumstances" element is not met. See Section I, Subsection B (explaining
more fully the incorrectness of the "partial payments" jury instruction). Therefore, the general
elements instructions contemplate full or partial payments of child support, and a separate
instruction is unnecessary. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201(1) (1999) (Criminal nonsupport is
committed when a person fails to provide for his child and the child "(a) is in needy
circumstances; or (b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a source
other than the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf.")
23

Conceivably, one or perhaps two duplicative instructions could be given without
unduly prejudicing a defendant because, in their entirety, the jury instructions could still
"'fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case.'" Widdison. 2000 UT App
185, H 52 (quoting State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992)). In this case,
however, five separate instructions were given regarding the failure to support a child. R.
80, 82, 83, 86, and 87. This was overemphasized at the expense of whether Mr.
Houghton had just cause for doing so, and was "as misleading to [the] jury as the
omission of a point." Clayton. 646 P.2d at 725.
The overemphasis of the element of failing to provide support rendered the jury
instructions inaccurate as a whole. '"[BJecause [t]he general rule is that an accurate
instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential, the failure to provide such
an instruction is reversible error that can never be considered harmless."9 Pearson, 1999
UT App 220, f 12. However, even if a showing of prejudice was required, the error
justifies a reversal. As indicated in the previous subsection, the evidence reasonably
supports afindingthat Mr. Houghton had just cause in failing to pay support. He paid
whatever he could towards Hillary's support, experienced health problems, and was
unable to find work. However, this evidence was submerged beneath the repetitive
emphasis upon Mr. Houghton's duty to pay. Without this overemphasis, there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have found just cause. Thus, Mr. Houghton's
conviction should be reversed and this case should be remanded for a new trial.

24

D. The Jury was Erroneously Given Three Irreconcilable Instructions
Regarding the Criminal Act of Failing to Support a Child
As a whole, the jury instructions were confusing because of their peculiar
inconsistencies. The jury was originally instructed that the prohibited act was, quite
simply, a defendant's failure to support his child. R. 80, 82. This accorded with the
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1) (1999), the plain language of which has remained
largely unqualified by case law.34 A subsequent instruction employed the idea of
reasonableness and indicated that "a parent must make reasonable efforts to find ways to
provide support for his or her children." R. 86. This instruction was then muddled by
another instruction which indicated that parents are required to "diligently seek
employment," to provide for their children. R. 87.
Whether the criminal act was any unmitigated failure to pay child support, or the
failure to make reasonable efforts to provide for a child, or the failure to make diligent
efforts to provide for a child, is, at best, unclear in the instructions. The confusion is
heightened considering that a lay jury cannot be expected to know all of the implications
of terms of art such as "just cause" and "reasonableness." As a whole, the charge is not
consistent or harmonious,35 and is misleading and confusing. This renders the jury verdict

See Id. Notes to Decisions (noting only six cases relevant to the statute in the last
century).
35

See Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 463 (13th ed. 1992) (The trial
judge's instructions, whether on his own motion or upon the request of a party ... should be
consistent and harmonious throughout the entire charge ....")
25

unreliable and reversible as a matter of law.

II. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SHOW THAT MR. HOUGHTON DID NOT HAVE JUST CAUSE IN
FAILING TO PAY FOR THE SUPPORT OF HIS DAUGHTER
The evidence does not support Mr. Houghton's conviction because it does not
show that Mr. Houghton's physical disabilities or his financial condition did not
constitute just cause for his failure to pay child support. Under section 76-7-201(1), as
explained in the jury instructions, R. 80-82, Mr. Houghton's conviction cannot be upheld
if the evidence does not show beyond a reasonable doubt37 that he "knowingly and
without just cause failed to provide for the support" of Hillary.38
36

State v. Pearson, 1999 UT App 220,1f 12, 985 P.2d 919 ("'[B]ecause [t]he general rule
is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential, the failure to
provide such an instruction is reversible error that can never be considered harmless.'")
37

R. 94. See State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980) (The evidence must be
sufficient to support the jury's verdict "beyond a reasonable doubt.")
38

R. 80, 82. The jury instructions are in accordance with the statute as it read before May
1,1995. The current version of the statute lacks the "without just cause" language. Utah Code
Ann. §76-7-201(1) (1999).
The "without just cause" language was correctly included in the jury instructions. The
period of time covered by the charge included three years prior to the change of the statute. R. 35. Because this Court applies "the law as it existed at the time of the crime charged," State v.
Redd, 1999 UT 108, f 4 n.2, 992 P.2d 986, the "without just cause" language was necessary
here.
Additionally, the statute, as it currently reads, violates federal and state constitutional
protections of due process and equal protection. It has long been held that, while poverty does
not immunize a defendant from criminal liability, poverty also cannot be the basis for criminal
liability. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 637-40 (1988); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 67273 (1983); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). In the context offinesand restitution, the
United States Supreme Court held that:
26

The evidence indicates that Mr. Houghton had just cause. He has spent the past
seven years living in old trailers and storage rooms on employers' properties, and he has
not earned anything more than board and room for himself. R. 141 [120-25]. His inability
to gain paid employment is due to his poor health. R. 141 [124-25]. Dating back to his
teenage years, he experienced tremors in his hands and this condition worsened over
time. R. 141 [74-75,115-16]. Other problems such as injuries and a hernia contributed to
his problems. R. 141 [115]. In spite of his efforts he has been unable to obtain full-time,
permanent employment since he lost his job at Snappy Welding Service in the mid1980s. R. 141 [70, 107-16]. Mr. Houghton testified that when he applied for work,

if the probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and
yet cannot do so through no fault of his own, it is fundamentally unfair to revoke
probation automatically without considering whether adequate alternative
methods of punishing the defendant are available.
Bearden. 461 U.S. at 668-69. An inquiry into whether a defendant had justifiable reasons for his
failure to pay is essential because, otherwise, his imprisonment "would be little more than
punishing a person for his poverty." Id at 671. This principle was acknowledged by this Court in
State v.Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 276-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue of a defendant's failure
to pay child support in Hicks v. Feiock. In that case, the Court held that a statute which requires
a criminal defendant to show his inability to make child support payments violates due process
because it undercuts the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Hicks, 485
U.S. at 637.
The current Criminal Nonsupport statute imposes criminal liability upon a defendant
solely for his knowing failure to pay support, if the child is in needy circumstances or would be
if not for the support of another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201(1) (1999). This mandates no
evaluation of a defendant's ability to pay or effort to pay. The statute lumps parents who have
made honest efforts to support their children with others who have willfully refused to pay child
support, and labels all of them criminals. Without a mandated inquiry into a defendant's ability
or effort to pay, the Criminal Nonsupport statute violates federal and state constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection.
27

"[w]hoever I was supposed to go to work for would see me shaking and wouldn't want
anything to do with me." R. 141 [125]. In these circumstances, a reasonable jury must
have had reasonable doubt about the absence of just cause.39
Revelent case law supports this. This Court held in State v. Barlow that the term
"just cause" refers to a defendant's "inability to provide support." State v. Barlow. 851
P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Recently, the Kansas Court of Appeals explored
the term in more detail, indicating that "just cause" means:
any cause of sufficient import to relieve the defendant, who under the law is
charged with the duty of providing for the support and maintenance of his
child, from such duty and legal obligation, such as mental incapacity or
physical disability of the defendant, rendering him unable to provide for the
support and maintenance of such child; or financial conditions which the
defendant has honestly, in good faith, endeavored to overcome.
State v. Filor. 13 P.3d 926, 928 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). The Kansas court also explained
that the term "just cause" was similar to the Kansas statutory term of "without lawful
excuse."40 In defining "without lawful excuse," the Alaska Court of Appeals indicated
that the State was required to show that "the accused either actually had funds available
for payment of support or that he could have obtained such funds through reasonable
efforts." Tavlorv. State, 710 P.2d 1019,1021 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). The Nevada
Supreme Court, which was favorably quoted by this Court in Barlow, indicated that

39

See State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443,444 (Utah 1983) ("We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.")
40

Id This Court made the same observation in Barlow. 851 P.2d at 1193.
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"without lawful excuse" implies "lack of just cause, excuse or justification." Epp v. State.
814 P.2d 1011, 1013 (1991) (citation omitted).
Here, the State has not shown that Mr. Houghton did not have just cause in failing
to provide for the support of Hillary. The evidence, fully marshaled and regarded in the
light most favorable to the State,41 is as follows:
* When Mr. Houghton was married to Ms. Parks in the mid-1980s, he was
steadily employed as a welder. R. 141 [70].
* At that time, Mr. Houghton wrote a resume which indicated that he had attended
one year of college in 1966-67 before working as a medic in the army. It also indicated
that he had studied respiratory therapy in the early 1970s before graduating with a
welding degree. Between 1975 and the late 1980s, he worked at welding, fabricating, and
similar -type jobs. Exhibit Envelope [Resume].
* Ms. Parks testified that, although Mr. Houghton had always had trouble with
shaking hands, it had never, to her knowledge, affected his employability. R. 141 [82].
* In 1993 Ms. Parks had a telephone conversation with Mr. Houghton in which he
indicated that, if Ms. Parks put him in jail for failing to pay child support, she would not
receive another penny. R. 141 [69].
* In 1993-94 Mr. Houghton stayed at the White City Domiciliary and received
medical attention for most of his health problems. R. 141 [117, 130]. He did not receive

41

See Petree, 659 P.2d at 444 ("[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.")
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successful treatment for his hand tremors, however. R. 141 [118-19].
* Mr. Houghton did not appeal the denial of disability benefits which he had
applied for by court order. R. 141 [126,139].
* Mr. Houghton "was humiliated" by the way people would look at him when he
applied for work, and he "got tired of applying." R. 141 [150]. He has never applied for
work at a fast food establishment. Id.
This evidence does not establish that Mr. Houghton did not have just cause in
failing to pay child support. It does not indicate that he had the financial means to pay,42
that he lacked excuse or justification in failing to pay,43 or that he did not make a bona
fide effort to overcome his health and financial obstacles in order to provide support.44
The evidence does not show that Mr. Houghton ever turned down offered work, failed to
try to get help for the health troubles that limited his ability to work, or failed to pay child
support when he had money.
Specifically, evidence that Mr. Houghton had experience as an army medic and
studied respiratory therapy would not likely benefit him in the job market twenty-five or
thirty years later. Since the early 1970s, Mr. Houghton's education and experience has

42

See Barlow. 851 P.2d at 1193 (holding that "just cause" refers to a defendant's
"inability to provide support").
43

See Epp. 814 P.2d at 1013 (indicating that "without lawful excuse," which is similar to
"just cause" indicates a "lack of just cause, excuse or justification.")
44

See Filor. 13 P.3d at 928 (holding that "just cause" implies someone who has honestly,
and in good faith, endeavored to overcome financial conditions which renders him unable to pay
child support).
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been in specialized manual labor fields such as welding, fabricating, and millwright
work. The State did not show that Mr. Houghton's health troubles or lack of opportunity
have not precluded him from obtaining such work.
The State attempted to minimize evidence of the negative effect of Mr.
Houghton's hand tremors upon potential employers by pointing out that Mr. Houghton
maintained steady employment in the mid-1980s in spite of the tremors. However, this
does not indicate that he had the ability to obtain or maintain employment after the
tremors had worsened.
Although the prosecutor was able to elicit testimony that Mr. Houghton got "tired
of applying'5 for jobs after experiencing feelings of humiliation, R. 141 [150], and also
that he had never applied for work at a fast food establishment, this was not sufficient to
meet the burden of proof. Testimony that Mr. Houghton became tired of applying for
work after years of disappointment and health problems does not indicate that he did not
make reasonable, or even diligent efforts to find work. Also, testimony that he did not
apply for a job in one particular field of work, fast food labor, does not indicate that he
did not make honest, reasonable efforts to obtain employment. It is not reasonable to
require a person to run the gamut of available fields of work in search of employment.
Such a requirement would be insurmountable to many people and impractical to most.
Likewise, Mr. Houghton's decision to forego an appeal of the denial of disability
benefits does not indicate that his efforts to provide support for Hillary were not in good
faith. Without more evidence concerning the denial or possible bases for appeal, there is
31

nothing to indicate that an appeal may have been successful. There is also nothing to
indicate whether such benefits would have been sufficient to pay the child support.
The prosecutor had the burden of proving that Mr. Houghton's efforts to
overcome his health and financial obstacles were not in good faith or reasonably
sufficient,45 and the prosecutor failed to meet this burden. In fact, the evidence supports
that Mr. Houghton experienced job loss, health problems, lack of opportunity, poverty,
and homelessness. This indicates an inability to pay,46 and constitutes just cause in failing
to pay. Therefore, Mr. Houghton's conviction fails.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Houghton's conviction should be reversed on the basis of insufficient
evidence. Alternatively, his conviction should be reversed and this case should be
remanded for a new trial because three of the jury instructions were argumentative,
duplicative, inconsistent with the other instructions, and incorrect statements of the law.

45

See Filor. 13 P.3d at 928 (indicating that a parent must make an honest, good faith
effort to overcome his health or financial conditions to provide for his child); Barlow. 851 P.2d
at 1193 (indicating that a parent's inability to support his child must be shown to be without
excuse or justification); Taylor. 710 P.2d at 1021 (indicating that a parent must make reasonable
efforts to obtain support money).
46

Bariow,851P.2datll93.
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ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs

Case No: 001905559 FS

STUART FOSTER HOUGHTON,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Judge:
Date:

J. DENNIS FREDERICK
December 15, 2000

ENTERCD IN REGISTRY
PRESENT
Clerk:
cindyb
P r o s e c u t o r : ANGELIDES, NICHOLAS J
Defendant
D e f e n d a n t ' s A t t o r n e y ( s ) : REMAL, LISA J .

OF JUDG,MENTS
DATE

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 4, 1948
Video
Tape Number:
1
Tape Count: 10:25-10:33
CHARGES
1. CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/08/2000 {Guilty Plea}
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

P^oc* 1

. . —.. I / M i-rv\kl

Case No: 001905559
Date:
Dec 15, 2000

SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court grants credit for 202 days time served.

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: LDA
Restitution:

Amount: $23870.20

Extradition:

SENTENCE TRUST NOTE

D^/r^i

O
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^e*t-\
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ADDENDUM B

76-7-201

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

History: C. 1953, 76-7-104, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-7-104.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Construction with other statutes.
Cited.
^
* *•
*u ±u
* * ±
Construction with other statutes.
There is no overlap between the rape of a
child statute, § 76-5-402.1, and this statute,

since for a conviction under the first statute the
state must prove the victim's age, and for a
conviction under this one that the participants
W ere unmarried. State ex rel. W.C.R v. State,
974 P.2d 302 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
vv

Cited in Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 P.
Supp. 1465 (D. Utah 1995).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adultery and
Fornication § 6.
C.J.S. — 37 C.J.S. Fornication § 2.

AXJL — Validity of statute making adultery
and fornication criminal offenses, 41 A.L.R.3d
1338.

PART 2
NONSUPPORT AND SALE OF CHILDREN
76-7-201. Criminal nonsupport.
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a child, or
children under the age of 18 years, he knowingly fails to provide for the support
of the spouse, child, or children when any one of them:
(a) is in needy circumstances; or
(b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a
source other than the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor:
(a) has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport, whether in this
state, any other state, or any court of the United States;
(b) committed the offense while residing outside of Utah; or
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months
within any 24-month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of $10,000.
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child born out of wedlock
whose paternity has been admitted by the actor or has been established in a
civil suit.
(5) (a) In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under this section, it is an
affirmative defense that the accused is unable to provide support. Voluntary unemployment or underemployment by the defendant does not give
rise to that defense.
(b) Not less than 20 days before trial the defendant shall file and serve
on the prosecuting attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim
the affirmative defense of inability to provide support. The notice shall
specifically identify the factual basis for the defense and the names and
addresses of the witnesses who the defendant proposes to examine in
order to establish the defense.
(c) Not more than ten days after receipt of the notice described in
Subsection (5)(b), or at such other time as the court may direct, the
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prosecuting attorney shall file and serve the defendant with a notice
containing the names and addresses of the witnesses who the state
proposes to examine in order to contradict or rebut the defendant's claim,
(d) Failure to comply with the requirements of Subsection (5)(b) or (5)(c)
entitles the opposing party to a continuance to allow for preparation. If the
court finds that a party's failure to comply is the result of bad faith, it may
impose appropriate sanctions.
History: C. 1963, 76-7-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-7-201; 1974, ch. 32, § 21;
1995, ch. 289, § 1; 1999, ch. 89, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, changed "sixteen"
to u18" and deleted "and without just cause"
after "knowingly" in Subsection (1); added "or
any court of the United States" in Subsection
(3Xa); added Subsection (6); and made stylistic
changes.
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999,
divided Subsection (1), adding the Subsection
(lXa) designation; added Subsection (1Kb); sub-

stituted "outside of Utah" for "in another state n
in Subsection (3)(b); added Subsection (3)(c);
deleted former Subsection (5) which read "In a
prosecution under this section, it is no defense
that the person to be supported received necessary support from a source other than the
defendant," redesignating Subsection (6) as (5);
and made related and stylistic changes
throughout the section.
Cross-References. — Power of juvenile
court, § 78-3a-104 et seq.
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,
§ 78-45f-100 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Statute. Riding v. Riding, 8 Utah 2d 136, 329
P.2d 878 (1958).

ANALYSIS

Defenses.
Duty of father.
—In general.
—Relief from duty to support.
Just cause.
Nonresident.

Just cause.
Under former § 76-15-1, it must have been
shown beyond reasonable doubt that children
were in destitute and necessitous circumstances, and father must have willfully neglected and refused, without just cause, to
Defenses.
provide for children; if it appeared that current
Under former Penal Code provision on deser- and necessary expenses for himself and chiltion of family it was no defense that destitute dren exceeded his earnings, that he had not
children were relieved by charitable acts of remained idle when he could have obtained
third persons. State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39, 137 P. employment, and had not wasted any part of
his earnings, he should have been acquitted.
829 (1913).
State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39, 137 P. 829 (1913).
Duty of father.
Defendant who worked, during the charged
period, in an apparently operable and operat—In general.
ing auto-repair shop licensed under his new
It was duty of father to support his minor wife's name failed to prove just cause for his
children if he was able to do so; and it was nonsupport and was therefore criminally liable.
criminal offense willfully to fail to support one's State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191 (Utah Ct. App.
minor children under age of sixteen years. 1993).
Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 55 Utah
566, 196 P. 556 (1921); Rockwood v. Rockwood, Nonresident.
Husband who was resident of another state
65 Utah 261, 236 P. 457 (1925).
could be charged with offense of failure to
—Relief from duty to support.
provide in state in which he had permitted his
Court had no right to make final order per- wife or children to live, or in which his misconmanently relieving father of his obligation to duct had induced them to seek refuge. Osborn v.
support his child, except under the Adoption Harris, 115 Utah 204, 203 P.2d 917 (1949).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - - 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and
Wife § 329.

A.LJt — Homicide by withholding food,
clothing, or shelter, 61 A.L.R.3d 1207.
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ADDENDUM C

Rule 19

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Right of defense m criminal prosecution to
disclosure of prosecution information regarding
prospective jurors, 86 A.L.R.3d 571.
Racial or ethnic prejudice of prospective juran as proper subject of inquiry or ground of

AL S i s 1

V ir

°

m

°n

^

94

426

dant's guilt, 50 A.L.R.4th 969.
Professional or business relations between
proposed juror and attorney as ground for chali en ge for cause, 52 A.L.R.4th 964
F a c t that juror in criminal case, or juror's
relatlVe

° r f h e n d ' h a S P reviouslv b e e n victlm *

wi
V i r rci x
i
„ criminal incident as ground of disqualification,
Religious belief, affiliation, or prejudice of 65 A L R 4fch 743
prospective juror as proper subject of inquiry or
r » ' \
^V^x^
i_ *.
Pro
ground for challenge on voir dire, 95 A.L R 3d
P™Jy ° f substituting juror in bifurcated
yj2
state trial after end of first phase and before
Excusing, on account of public, charitable, or s e c o n d p h a s e 1S ^ v e n to j u r y > 8 9 A L R 4 t h 423.
educational employment, one qualified and not
Exclusion of public and media from voir dire
specifically exempted as juror in state criminal examination of prospective jurors in state cnmcase as ground of complaint by accused, 99 m a * case, 16 A.L.R.5th 152.
A.L.R.3d 1261.
Use of peremptory challenges to exclude ethAdditional peremptory challenges because of n i c an( * racial groups, other than black Amenmultiple criminal charges, 5 A.L.R.4th 533
cans, from criminal jury — post-Batson state
Validity and construction of statute or court cases, 20 A.L.R.5th 398.
rule prescribing number of peremptory chalUse of peremptory challenges to exclude Caulenges in criminal cases according to nature of casian persons, as a racial group, from criminal
offense or extent of punishment, 8 A.L.R 4th jury — post-Batson state cases, 47 A.L.R.5th
149.
259
Cure of prejudice resulting from statement
Examination and challenge of federal case
by prospective juror during voir dire, m pres- jurors on basis of attitudes toward homosexuence of other prospective jurors, as to defen- ahty, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 864

Rule 19. Instructions.
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court
reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct
the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy
of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions
may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement.
(b) Upon each written request s 0 presented and given, or refused, the court
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of
the charge was given and what part was refused.
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice.
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court^
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the
exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court ha*
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon!
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Effect of submitting
Elements of offense.
Failure to request or object.
-Review without objection.
Objections.
—Failure to object
—Specificity
—Tune
Presumptions
Requests by jury
Specific instructions
—Circumstantial evidence

__ Elements of offense
-Lesser included offenses
, . , x ,.
.
rT
J i C l
-Unreliability of eyewitness identification.
—Verdict-urging instruction
Untimely request.
Cited.
Effect of submitting.
When an instruction is submitted by a part
that same party cannot later object to it, he hi
already waived any objection and endorsed it i

